Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy - Parliamentary Briefing
Canada has an Indo-Pacific strategy? Since when?
Regular posts on The Audit are going strong. But once again, since there’s still no sign of life from Parliament’s committees, I’ll have to devote another Briefing to a recently-filed report - this one Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Two Years Later, from the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship.
The new report’s 34 recommendations include some aspirational goals to increase military spending and assess various potential military threats. Policy positions on self-determination for Taiwan and some tentative nods in the direction of the persecuted Uyghur population were also visible.
There were also direct references to the fact that, to a large extent, Canada just doesn’t matter to Indo-Pacific countries. Take, as an example, Recommendation 31:
“That the Government of Canada focus its efforts to increase its relevance in the Indo-Pacific region on further establishing bilateral people-to-people ties and developing targeted expertise to benefit the region.”
That general “soft power” themed response to the problem shows up more than once. For instance, the report suggested we:
“Speed up and clarify the process for access to funding for Canadian non-governmental organizations in order to strengthen people-to-people and institutional ties with the IndoPacific region” (Recommendation 16)
“Establish a knowledge exchange program on Indigenous issues with the governments and Indigenous peoples in the Indo-Pacific region” (Recommendation 17)
“Examine ways to invest in higher education, particularly in a research chair program at Canadian university institutions to support Canadian capacity building with respect to the Indo-Pacific and thus foster the development of enduring societal ties between Canada and the region” (Recommendation 18)
“Establish more programs that give academics from the Indo-Pacific region an opportunity to study for master’s and doctorate degrees at Canadian universities” (Recommendation 25)
“Define ‘clean energy,’ which appears four times in the Indo-Pacific Strategy” (Recommendation 27)
Call me a cynic - or perhaps I just don’t understand the true goals here - but I’m having trouble visualizing how those will lead to progress.
Nevertheless there was also an awful lot that wasn’t said, and those might be the most interesting bits. Only minimal space was devoted to Chinese election interference, for example. And consider the fact that explicit references to natural gas exports didn’t make it into any of the recommendations.
So here’s the conversation about the report that I had with my friendly AI tool:
The Audit: In the context of increasing trade with the Indo-Pacific region, were there any references to gas exports?
Yes, in the document "Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Two Years Later," there are several references to gas exports, particularly Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), in the context of increasing trade with the Indo-Pacific region:
LNG Canada Project:
Ambassador McKay mentions the LNG Canada terminal at Kitimat, British Columbia, which is expected to be operational by 2025. He notes that this project will make Canada a "meaningful contributor" of LNG to the Indo-Pacific region. He also highlights that the project is anticipated to replace Russian gas supplies to Japan, with Mitsubishi, a Japanese company, holding a 15% stake in LNG Canada.
Ambassador Yamanouchi from Japan echoes this, stating that Japan, with an energy self-sufficiency rate of 13%, is very interested in the LNG Canada project. He expects that LNG Canada will export 2.1 million tonnes to Japan, describing this as "a serious number."
Energy Security and Demand:
Frank Des Rosiers, Assistant Deputy Minister of Strategic Policy and Innovation at the Department of Natural Resources, discusses the strong market response for Canadian LNG, noting increased demand due to factors like Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which has pushed countries like Japan to seek alternative energy sources.
Economic and Strategic Implications:
Jeff Kucharski from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute points out the omission of Canadian hydrocarbon resources like LNG in the Indo-Pacific Strategy as a significant oversight, given the demand in the Indo-Pacific for these products. He argues that Canadian LNG exports could help reduce coal emissions in the region.
Shannon Joseph, Chair of Energy for a Secure Future, concurs, emphasizing that many Indo-Pacific allies are looking to Canadian LNG for energy security and democratic cooperation.
The Audit: Does the report acknowledge Canada's limited relevance and leverage in the region?
Yes, the report acknowledges Canada's limited relevance and leverage in the Indo-Pacific region in several ways:
Modest Influence and Impact:
Gordon Houlden states that "Canada will remain, on balance, a minor factor in the Indo-Pacific region, but major events in the region will profoundly affect Canada. That's the harsh reality for us - modest influence but potentially great impact." This underscores Canada's relatively small role compared to the major powers in the region.
Need for Relevance:
Meredith Lilly explicitly mentions that Canada must be relevant to the Indo-Pacific to be an engaged, active, and reliable partner, but she believes Canada is currently failing on this front. She stresses the need for Canada to focus on areas where it can contribute positively to prove its relevance.
Soft Power and Reputation:
Dominique Caouette (Professor and Chair, Asian and Indo-Pacific Studies, Université de Montréal) discusses how Canada's power of attraction or influence has weakened over the years due to a lack of continuity in policies and a perceived lack of direction in Canada's engagement strategy. He notes that Canada's posture towards the region is "if not confused, at least not specifically directed," which suggests a diminished soft power influence.
Economic and Strategic Limitations:
Hugh Stephens (Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada) points out the challenge of Canada being perceived as a "little brother to the United States" in the eyes of ASEAN member states. He recommends that Canada find specific areas where it can make a positive contribution to establish its own relations based on unique values and offerings.
Strategic Recommendations:
Recommendation 31: The report specifically recommends that the Government of Canada focus its efforts to increase its relevance in the Indo-Pacific region by further establishing bilateral people-to-people ties and developing targeted expertise to benefit the region. This recommendation directly acknowledges the need to bolster Canada's relevance.
Comparative Disadvantage:
Witnesses like Cleo Paskal and Stephen Nagy discuss how Canada has lost opportunities due to its environmental policies, particularly in not being able to export energy resources like LNG to countries that seek stable, transparent energy sources. This indicates a comparative disadvantage in leveraging economic influence in the region.
Regional Perception and Engagement:
The document also mentions skepticism from the region about Canada's commitment to sustained engagement. For instance, Jia Wang (Deputy Director of the University of Alberta’s China Institute) cautions that countries in the region might question if Canada is committed to advancing common goals long-term, highlighting a perception of inconsistency or lack of sustained presence.
The Audit: Based on the report's own assessments, how successful has Canada been at countering threats from China?
Security and Military Engagement:
Partial Success: Canada has increased its military presence in the region, including naval deployments to contentious areas like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. However, there are noted concerns about Canada's capacity for long-term commitment due to personnel readiness and funding issues within the Canadian Armed Forces. Recommendations for increased military spending and focusing on niche areas like cyber warfare and AI suggest that while there has been some progress, more is needed.
Economic Security and Coercion:
Limited Success: The document discusses the PRC's use of economic coercion, particularly with examples like the canola and beef export bans. While Canada has made efforts to diversify trade partners, the strategy acknowledges the challenge of reducing dependence on China, which remains a dominant trade partner in the region. The lack of concrete measures to counter economic coercion effectively is noted, with recommendations for a review of marketing strategies and exploring alternative markets to mitigate geopolitical risk.
Human Rights and Political Influence:
Moderate Success: Canada has taken a stance on human rights issues in China, particularly concerning the Uyghur situation and forced labor. However, the document criticizes the current approaches such as the bilateral human rights dialogues as "powerless and ineffective." There's a call for more public and robust discussions, legislative measures against goods produced by forced labor, and stronger international collaboration to pressure China. This suggests a mixed success where moral and diplomatic stances are made, but practical impact on the ground remains limited.
Diplomatic Engagement:
Ongoing Effort: The strategy has framed Canada's diplomatic interactions with China, resuming high-level visits, but the document emphasizes the need for pragmatic diplomacy, balancing cooperation with challenging China on human rights and other issues. The presence of an Indo-Pacific Special Envoy and the need for consistent, sustained diplomatic engagement are highlighted, indicating that while there is effort, the success is still in the process of being realized.
Regional Partnerships and Influence:
Developing: Canada's engagement with other regional players like Japan, ASEAN countries, and Australia shows some positive steps towards countering China's influence. The document suggests that Canada should focus on building "minilateral" partnerships, though it notes skepticism about joining highly militarized alliances like AUKUS due to potential backlash from Southeast Asian nations. Canada's relevance in the region is questioned, with recommendations for Canada to offer unique value, particularly in areas like clean technology and education.
